Philosophy & Inquiries

A running record of what I'm reading, questioning, and trying to think clearly about. This isn't a set of conclusions, it's a log of an ongoing process. Where something is my own interpretation rather than an established idea, I've tried to say so plainly.

I'm not trained in philosophy formally — this section is me thinking in public, not lecturing. Disagreement and correction are welcome.

Thinkers Explored

  • J. Krishnamurti: I'm exploring Krishnamurti's ideas on choiceless awareness and the limits of self-observation. His insistence that the observer is the observed challenges conventional notions of self-improvement through discipline or practice. I'm particularly interested in how this applies to everyday mental habits and the search for clarity without ideological frameworks.
  • Albert Camus: Camus' concept of the absurd — the conflict between our search for meaning and the silent universe — resonates with my own questions about purpose. Rather than offering escape through religion or ideology, he proposes embracing the absurd while continuing to live with passion and integrity. I'm examining what it means to 'keep going' without appeal to external meaning.
  • Fyodor Dostoevsky: Through Dostoevsky's novels, I'm exploring questions of free will, moral responsibility, and the psychology of suffering. Works like Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov present characters grappling with ethical choices in psychologically rich ways that philosophical treatises often miss. I'm interested in how fiction can reveal philosophical truths about human nature that abstract reasoning might overlook.
  • Ramana Maharshi: Ramana Maharshi's self-inquiry practice — repeatedly asking 'Who am I?' to dismantle false identifications — appeals to me as a method of direct investigation rather than a belief system to adopt. Unlike doctrinal teachings, this approach encourages personal experimentation with awareness. I'm exploring how this simple question can undermine habitual assumptions about identity and consciousness.
  • Osho: I find Osho useful primarily as a provocative challenger to conventional thinking, even if many of his specific claims lack credibility. His willingness to question sacred cows — whether religious, political, or psychological — creates intellectual friction that can be valuable for testing one's own assumptions. I engage with him critically, extracting useful challenges while rejecting unfounded doctrines, treating him as a catalyst for inquiry rather than an authority.

Notes

On Krishnamurti and the Mechanics of the Observer

Epistemology • Published 2025-11-14

Krishnamurti argues that psychological conflict begins when the observer separates themselves from what is observed—treating fear, envy, or restlessness as an external object to be managed or suppressed.

When reading this alongside contemporary cognitive psychology, the central question is whether direct observation without internal verbal commentary is neurologically sustainable, or if the 'silent observer' is simply another sub-network of narrative metacognition.

My working hypothesis: non-verbal attention does not eliminate mental constructs, but slows the recursive loop of reactive self-justification, allowing one to notice automatic habits before acting on them.

Camus: The Absurd as an Epistemic Baseline

Existentialism • Published 2025-10-02

In The Myth of Sisyphus, the absurd is not a property of the universe alone; it is the friction produced when the human longing for clarity collides with an unanswering world. Rather than leaping into metaphysical certainty or cynicism, Camus demands maintaining the tension without illusion.

For scientific and data work, this serves as a useful discipline: accept the presence of unresolvable ambiguity and missing data without losing the appetite for rigorous, sustained inquiry.

Dostoevsky on Rational Egoism and Irrational Will

Psychology & Ethics • Published 2025-08-19

Reading Notes from Underground against modern behavioral economics: utilitarian and rational choice models often assume that individuals will act in their enlightened self-interest once adequately informed. Dostoevsky's underground narrator directly attacks this assumption—humans will deliberately choose irrationality, suffering, and spite if that is what preserves their sense of autonomy.

Any computational or institutional system that assumes pure utility maximization consistently misjudges human behavior because it underestimates the human refusal to be treated as a predictable equation.